In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This paper considers variations of the electorate, when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of alternatives. Such a situation is formalized by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, and exhibit a liberal social choice function and a promotion mechanism which are stable. A notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state is investigated. The latter is useful in analyzing the membership of the Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR), 1926-1930. 
INTRODUCTION
In the paradigm social choice problem» there is a fixed set of alternatives A'and a fixed set of voters N.
Structure is added to the problem by imposing restrictions on admissible profiles of voters' preferences or on the characteristics of the social choice function.
If one allows for unrestricted domain of preference profiles and requires only that social choice be non-empty, essentially no structure is added.
This paper considers social choice functions, all of which have a variable electorate structure: different groups of voters have a special voice on different subsets of alternatives. Examples of such situations abound in practicc. VThen a society is deliberating an extension of the franchise, those presently enfranchised have a special voice on the enfranchisement of others. Property rights give an agent a special voice of those social states that concern his property. Rank often gives an agent a special voice on questions of promotion in a hierarchy.
Although such social choice functions are important, they have not been much studied in the formal literature. Two important exceptions to this should be cited at once. First, the literature on liberal social choice functions (Sen, 1976 ) studies a special kind of electorate variation, akin to property rights. Second, KleVorick and Kramer (1973) and Gardner (1981) give examples of convergent sequences of social choice, where at each step of the sequence, an agent's voting strength is social state-dependent. UTiat the present paper proposes is a general formalism for dealing with variable electorates, the veto function. Interest focuses in the next section on stable veto functions, those which lead to non-empty -2- social choice and have non-empty cores. Section 3 applies stable veto functions to the question of liberal social choice. Here we prove the existence of a strategically consistent liberal social -function, essentially
Gibbard's system of first-order rights (Gibbard, 1974 A coalition may be powerless ($ = V(S)), but no coalition may stymie the social choice (A e V(S)).
Pareto. V(N) = 2^^-A.
The grand coalition has veto poxi/er consistent with standardness.
Monotonicity. B e V(S) and B^B', then B' e V(S).
If a coalition can veto B, it can veto any subset of B.
Superadditivity.^If Sj^and S2 are disjoint coalitions, Bj^e V(Sj^)
and B2 e V(S2)» then Bj^^B2 e V(Si^^^2^' Disjoint coalitions do not lose veto power when they join forces. Note however that 2^-A is not an ideal over A. Such a construction satisfies the conditions for a veto function, and will be used repeatedj-y in the sequel.
A coalition must have both the will and the power to exercise its veto,-.' this regard, a rather conservative criterion governs the will to veto: no member of a coalition ever regrets the exercise of that coalition's veto. Formally, let x^(S) denote the set {y e A: yP^x for
Then S exercises its veto over x if and only if A -x^(S) e V(S). An alternative is stable if no coalition exercises its veto against it.
A veto function V is stable if the set of stable alternatives is non-empty. Stable veto functions have two interpretations, first as social choice functions, and second as .cooper&clve games in normal form.
In the latter interpretation, the strategy set of each coalition consists of its veto options. In particular, the core of a stable veto function is non-empty. A stable veto function is strategically consistent social choice, since outcomes sincerely revealed by preferences are in the core of the corresponding cooperative game. Stable veto functions thus form the focus . of the sections that follow. is Introduced, which is common to both Sen's condition L (Sen, 1970 ) and Gibbard*s condition (Gibbard, 1974) . The main result is that the veto function satisfying minimal liberalism and the ideal-based construction is stable. However, stronger liberalism conditions jeopardize stability.
The minimal, condition of liberalism is that for'each individual 1
there is a social state over which 1 has veto power. Suppose that no The veto function for groups is based on the ideal construction of the last section. Thus, the veto function of {l,j} is the ideal V({i.j}) = {0,{x^}, {x^}, {x.,x^^}}.
To satisfy the standardness condition, altsrnatlves must outnumber voters;
otherwise, V(S) contains A for some S N.
Under the no-regret hypothesis, one can now show the following: Table 2 shows the difference that this makes to the outcomes.
The social choice function in table 2 has already been mentioned in the literature: it accords what Gibbard calls a system of first-order rights (Gibbard, 1974, p. 403) . What Proposition 1 implies is that for such a system of rights, the sincere outcome is also in the core of the associated cooperative game. For systems according higher-order rights, in particular for systems satisfying Gibbard*s condition L2, the above strategic consistency no longer obtains. A sincere outcome need not be in the core (Gardner, 1980) . Thus, there is an inevitable conflict between the strength of a libertarian claim and the demand for strategic consistency. Standardness', For all S C Nq, $ e V(S).
Pareto', V(Nq) = 2^.
However, one of the main concerns is when the group does not dissolve.
The concept of individual preferences also poses some problems, since I the alternatives being ordered are themselves sets of individuals.
Here, although it is not necessary for the results, the presentation is greatly simplified by assuming that preferences are measurable. Let be an ordering of 2^and its numerical representation, u^is measurable when Uj_(S) « E u (j) . The notion of. winning here is relative to Nq. Let Wbe the set of winning coalitions relative to Nq: W= { SC.'N^: S is winning }, Finally, let C(Nq) denote the group which is part of every winning coalition:
S E W C(Nq) is non-empty when Wrepresents an oligarchy or collegial polity. (Brown,1975) Let the group membership question, both purge and recruitment, be 
Proof. Restrict attention to a winning coalition S. G(S) O G(Nq).
By the hypothesis of measurability of utility, for any group S', the members of S unanimously prefer G(Hq)US' to S*. Thus, if G(Nq) C they are not purged, and if they are not members, they are recruited.
Again, if preferences are selfish, then every member i"of .C(Sq)
prefers Nq to N -{i}. Since i is a member of every winning coalition, no purge of i can take place.
Under the Pareto extension rule, Nq = C(Nq). When preferences are selfish, no current member is purged. This result can be compared to those of the last section, since a natural liberal condition in this case would be that no agent be purged unless he judges himself bad (u^(i) < 0).
Such a condition , although it would guarantee that the group not dissolve, would nevertheless conflict with the principle of majority rule, however qualified.
-Jhen the outcome of the group, menibership question is the group itself, one can call the group stable. Its members wish to carry out no purges, nor do they wish to recruit further members. Even if Nq is not stable, one would expect there to be some other set which is stable. The following proposition shows the existence of a stable group under majority rule. Let V be an n-dimensional square matrix of I's and -I's; The first constraint corresponds to the fact that in a stable group no member is purged (has a m^jprity opposed); the second, to the fact that no further member is recruited (has a majority in favor). The problem -15-is feasible since x = 0 is a feasible solution. The problem is bounded since < n. Hence,, there exists an optimal solution. As long as V has one positive element, the 0-vector is not optimal and the maximal group is not empty.
Note that only a very weak form of measurability was needed to establish the above result. Also, Proposition 3 can be extended to the cases where C(Nq) is not empty, simply by adding constraints to the problem (LP).
The proposition gives a simple test for when the largest possible group N is stable, namely, that the column sums of V all be non-negative.
Given the existence of stable groups, one is led to define the group membership dynamics where is the group at decision stage t and f(N|.) is the outcome of the group membership decision at t. Indeed, if S = Nj. is stable, then it is a fixed point of the dynamics, S = f(S),
One might suppose that these dynamics are stable, in the sense that they converge to a stable-group. However, this need not be the-case, as the following example shows. Social choice theory is becoming more and more concerned with structured social choice, and rightly so. What we have tried to show here is that the veto function has an important role to play in this line of research.
